Is There an Alternative Strategy for Reducing Public Debt by 2032? by Blot, Christophe et al.
 
 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 1, Special Issue, pp. 39-57 
Received: 16 September 2013; Accepted: 05 December 2013. 
 
UDC 336.3:338.124.4 (4-672 EU)
DOI: 10.2298/PAN1401039B
Original scientific paper
 
 
Christophe Blot 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques - Centre de recherche en 
économie de Sciences Po,  
France 
 
 christophe.blot@sciencespo.fr 
 
Marion Cochard 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques - Centre de recherche en 
économie de Sciences Po,  
France 
 
 marion.cochard@sciencespo.fr 
 
Jérôme Creel 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques,  
ESCP Europe,  
France 
 
 jerome.creel@sciencespo.fr 
 
Bruno Ducoudré 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques - Centre de recherche en 
économie de Sciences Po,  
France 
 
 bruno.ducoudre@sciencespo.fr 
 
Danielle  
Schweisguth 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques - Centre de recherche en 
économie de Sciences Po,  
France 
 
 danielle.schweisguth@sciencespo.fr 
 
Xavier Timbeau 
 
Observatoire français des conjonctures 
economiques - Centre de recherche en 
économie de Sciences Po,  
France 
 
 xavier.timbeau@sciencespo.fr 
 
 
 
This paper draws on a larger project, 
iAGS, with IMK and ECLM institutes, 
and benefited of funding from the 
Socialists & Democrats Parliamentary 
Group at the European Parliament. The 
paper was presented at the 10th 
International Conference in “Develop-
ments in Economic Theory and Policy”, 
at University of the Basque Country, 
Bilbao (Spain), June 27-28, 2013. We 
thank participants for their comments. 
Is There an Alternative Strategy 
for Reducing Public Debt by 2032? 
 
Summary: EMU countries have engaged in fiscal consolidation since 2011.
This strategy has proven to be costly in terms of GDP. This cost has been
amplified by the fact that fiscal multipliers are high in time of crisis, as recently
stressed by the literature. Within this context, we wonder whether there is an
alternative strategy aiming at bringing back the debt ratio to 60% of GDP in
2032, meanwhile lowering output losses. To this end, we report simulations
realized from a simple model describing the Eurozone and the timing for con-
solidation. Based on a pragmatic view of the fiscal compact, we find an alterna-
tive path for consolidation which achieves a 60% threshold for public debt over
the next 20 years in most euro area countries.
Key words: Public debt, Growth, European macroeconomic policy. 
JEL: E61, E62, E47.
 
 
Expansionary fiscal policies undertaken in 2009, when the world economy was 
strongly hit by the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, have been short-
lived. EMU countries have indeed clearly engaged in a consolidation of fiscal poli-
cies since 2011. The objectives are twofold. In the short run, governments aim at 
bringing back the deficit ratio to 3% of GDP, as recommended by the Stability and 
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Growth Pact (SGP). In the long run, in accordance with the new fiscal rules embed-
ded in the revised SGP or the Fiscal compact, the objective is to reach a debt ratio of 
a least 60% of GDP by 2032. For the advocates of such a frontloaded strategy, con-
solidation is needed to restore credibility of fiscal policies and to reduce long-term 
interest rates. The sovereign debt crisis has indeed urged national governments into 
dealing with the sustainability of public finances. The rise of financial market pres-
sures, the lack of a “true” central bank (endorsing the role of a lender of last resort), 
and the absence of debt pooling between member states explained this choice. Yet as 
this paper shows, this choice is not appropriate. 
The on-going strategy is unambiguously costly. It puts a drag on demand and 
triggers a rise in unemployment. The question is then, how large are these costs and 
is there an alternative strategy? The aim of the paper is precisely to deal with these 
issues. It considers explicitly that the Eurozone is facing a tradeoff between unem-
ployment and public debt, both of which are interlinked. Up to now, the Eurozone 
has given the priority to the reduction of public debt. But as it has recently been hig-
hlighted by Dawn Holland and Johnatan Portes (2012), this strategy is self-defeating. 
The Eurozone entered a new recession, the reduction path of public deficits is disap-
pointing regarding the strong negative fiscal stance and the liquidity crisis1 on the 
debt markets eased only after the announcement by the ECB that it might intervene 
in countries under program, i.e. countries undergoing a fiscal consolidation whose 
composition would have to be agreed upon by the Troïka.  
This paper does not only confirm the failure of the strategy of a frontloaded 
consolidation. It discusses an alternative scenario built upon simulations based on a 
reduced-form model. More precisely, we suggest that keeping the target of a debt 
ratio of 60 % by 2032 and spreading (or softening) consolidation would enhance 
growth. For most countries, public debt is significantly reduced in the long-term 
while in the short run, economic growth is higher. 
The main reason behind this failure is that austerity policies have been imple-
mented in countries which have been already facing a highly degraded economic 
situation that entailed high fiscal multipliers. A growing literature on fiscal multip-
liers has indeed emphasized that fiscal multipliers are higher during recessions than 
in normal times2. In such a case, attempting to reduce debt by fiscal consolidation 
generates higher debt and unemployment. Spain is the perfect illustration of this very 
frustrating dynamics. In contrast, consolidation should be postponed until unem-
ployment is lower, hence until fiscal multipliers are smaller. 
Besides, we stress that existing treaties and the fiscal compact allow for a 
more relaxed path for fiscal consolidation. Even if other fiscal rules may lead to bet-
ter economic outcomes (Jérôme Creel, Paul Hubert, and Francesco Saraceno 2012), 
we adopt a pragmatic view where fiscal framework is unchanged. It is clear that the 
rational for these rules is open to question. The need for fiscal rules has often been 
contested. Debt sustainability does not boil down the 60% ratio for public debt. But 
                                                        
1 See Paul De Grauwe and Yumei Ji (2013) for an analysis of the failure of austerity to dampen panic on 
the financial markets. 
2 See Miguel Almunia et al. (2010) for an argument based on the situation during the Great Depression. 
See Eric Heyer (2012) for a short review of the literature. 
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the path of consolidation should be based on a pragmatic view (to be opposed to a 
dogmatic view) on what is suitable, given existing rules, for debt reduction over the 
next 20 years. It should be add that despite changes in May 2013 for a few countries 
as regards the pace of their consolidation strategy, it seems that the Commission still 
relies on the same forecasting model that inspired its original frontloaded strategy 
(Marion Cochard and Danielle Schweisguth 2013). 
To assess interactions between debt and unemployment reduction, we present 
the results from simulations based on a simple reduced-form model representing 11 
euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). Then, as a strong debate still exists about 
the value of multipliers and about the empirical evaluation of current output gaps, 
and also because there is of course irreducible uncertainty about future growth, we 
have chosen to parameterize the model in such a way that we can conduct a full sen-
sitivity analysis. Finally, we address the search for the optimal fiscal stance, defined 
as the most appropriate fiscal consolidation path to reduce the costs of unemploy-
ment and fulfill fiscal rules in terms of reduction of public debt at horizon 2032.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the Section 1, we draw on the 
EU fiscal framework to assess the stringency of EU fiscal rules and explore the scope 
for an alternative strategy to ensure “fiscal sustainability” in due respect of EU regu-
lations and treaties. The main features of the model, which is used for simulations, 
are presented in the Section 2. The Section 3 shows that the actual path of consolida-
tion is ill-designed. Finally, the Section 4 presents alternative strategies. 
 
1. Margins for Maneuver within the Actual EU Fiscal 
Framework 
 
There are currently five fiscal rules which must be fulfilled by EU Member States. 
Except for one fiscal rule exclusively related to the Fiscal Compact - the new me-
dium-term fiscal objective, see fifth fiscal rule below - all EU fiscal rules have been 
in force since at least November 2011.  
First, the cornerstone of European fiscal rules remains the public deficit to 
GDP limit at 3%. Deficits above this threshold can be labelled “excessive deficits”, 
setting in train an excessive deficit procedure. 
Second, the public-debt-to-GDP ratio must be limited to 60% of GDP or it 
must be decreasing towards this level. The first and second fiscal rules are embedded 
in the Stability and Growth Pact originally introduced in 2005. The first rule has been 
the cornerstone of European fiscal rules since 1997 and the first version of the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, whereas the second rule was only a convergence criterion be-
tween 1997 and 2005, before it was introduced in the first reformed version of the 
SGP. Legally speaking, the debt-rule was not a binding constraint on Euro area 
members states between 1999 (creation of the euro) and 2005.  
They were confirmed by the revised Stability and Growth Pact adopted in No-
vember 2011 under Council Regulations 1173/2011, 1175/2011 and 1177/2011. 
Third, if the public-debt ratio is above the threshold limit, the ratio will be 
considered to diminish at a sufficient pace if the difference between actual debt and 
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the 60%-of-GDP limit has been decreasing during the three preceding years at an 
average yearly rate of 1/20th of the difference. This 1/20th debt rule is incorporated in 
the revised Stability and Growth Pact adopted in November 2011 under Council 
Regulation 1177/2011, article 2, par. 1bis. It has also been included in the Fiscal 
Compact, article 4, of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
EMU of March 2012.  
Fourth, if a Member State is under an excessive deficit procedure, Council 
Regulation 1177/2011, article 3, states that: “in its recommendation, the Council 
shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which, on the 
basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a mini-
mum annual improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically 
adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the cor-
rection of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation”. In its 
article 5, Regulation 1175/2011 restates the same benchmark of a yearly improve-
ment of 0.5% of GDP of the cyclically-adjusted deficit to reach the medium-term 
fiscal objective of a balanced-budget expressed in structural terms.  
Fifth, the medium-term fiscal objective was made more precise in the Fiscal 
Compact, article 3. It states that general government budgets shall be balanced or in 
surplus, a criterion that: “shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural 
balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective, 
as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural 
deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices”.  
Some of the above-mentioned rules are conditional on exceptional circums-
tances. Such has always been the case for the first rule. However the strictness of 
exceptional circumstances has largely changed over the years. Between 1999 and 
2005, exceptional circumstances meant a recession: a yearly real GDP growth rate of 
at least -2% permitted automatically delayed austerity to converge towards the 3%-
of-GDP limit for the public deficit and balanced budget in the mid-run. A yearly real 
GDP growth rate of at least -0.75% permitted delayed austerity provided a majority 
of MS approved these exceptional circumstances. In 2005, the scope of exceptional 
circumstances was widened to encompass the implementation of structural reforms 
that were elaborated to cope with the Lisbon agenda strategy, and the implementation 
of public investment. Moreover, an unexpected economic slowdown could be consi-
dered as exceptional circumstances.  
The 2011 body of legislation - the 6-pack - recalls the reform of the 1997 ver-
sion of the SGP. It opens up a scope to use pension reforms as authorizing a public 
finances’ gap vis-à-vis the convergence path towards the medium-run deficit objec-
tive (article 5, regulation 1175/2011). The fiscal compact introduced the following 
(complementary) definition of exceptional circumstances: “an unusual event outside 
the control of the (MS) which has a major impact on the financial position of the 
general government or periods of severe economic downturn as set out in the revised 
SGP, provided that the temporary deviation (…) does not endanger fiscal sustainabil-
ity in the medium-term” (article 3, (b)). The definition of an “unusual event” remains 
unclear.  
Finally, the first and fifth EU fiscal rules are conditional on exceptional cir-
cumstances.  
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Drawing on these circumstances and on the fourth rule of a yearly improve-
ment of 0.5% of GDP of the cyclically-adjusted deficit, it is possible to show that EU 
fiscal rules give fiscal leeway under current economic circumstances. 
As a conclusion, the implementation of structural reforms should not be 
viewed as the only justification for softening the stance on fiscal austerity: severe 
economic downturn is also included as an exceptional circumstance to postpone fis-
cal efforts, and achievements of cyclically-adjusted annual improvements of public 
finances above a threshold of 0.5% of GDP are not legally required.  
The EU does not have to change its position in order to soften the fiscal 
stances of Euro area countries facing excessive deficits. Notwithstanding a possible 
change in this position in the future, there are already ample margins for maneuver in 
the short run to escape “self-defeating austerity” under the present legislation.  
 
2. Short Description of the Model and Calibration 
 
The simulations are realized with a macroeconomic model that combines structural 
and reduced-form non-linear equations. An exhaustive presentation of the model and 
its calibration is available in the appendix of iAGS 2012 Report3. It is a simple re-
duced-form equation model to analyse complex supply and demand mechanisms that 
can be heterogeneous across countries. Hence the model is not the by-product of op-
timal behaviours. There have been multiple competing ways to obtain optimal equi-
libria though no consensus has ever emerged on the best modelling strategy4. More-
over, Dynamic Standard General Equilibrium (DSGE) models proved to perform 
poorly during the crisis (Jean-Bernard Chatelain and Kirsten Ralf 2012), underesti-
mating the deepness of the crisis. These models also do not embed nonlinearities. It 
notably does not allow for variable fiscal multiplier over the business cycle, since 
these models are linearised around a single equilibrium. In our approach, the value of 
the fiscal multiplier is endogenous and determined according to the size of the output 
gap. The parameters of the model are calibrated to allow the analyses of various sce-
narios. It is far more tractable than DSGE models and given the current context, it 
may better capture the effect of fiscal policy on the output gap. It does not rest on 
structural hypotheses regarding agents’ behaviour (representative rational agent), 
hypotheses which are today largely debated (Giorgio Fagiolo and Andrea Roventini 
2012). Alternative hypothesis can be easily implemented. Considering the value of 
the fiscal multiplier, the model may reproduce Keynesian or New Classical hypothe-
ses. Then the aim is not to give normative conclusions regarding economic policy but 
to shed some lights on the effects of various economic policy shocks according a 
given set of transparent hypotheses.  
The key features of the model are that: i) the model allows for an explicit rep-
resentation of the main countries of the euro area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An aggregated 
                                                        
3 Xavier Timbeau et al. (2013).  
4 See Volker Wieland et al. (2012) for a comparison of fiscal policy effects on output gap for a large set 
of DSGE models. These models make different assumptions on the share of liquidity constrained house-
holds for example, a point that is crucial to assess the fiscal multiplier. 
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euro area is also computed in order to deal with global (rest-of-the-world) analysis 
and monetary policy; ii) on the demand side, an open economy aggregate demand 
function is modelled, with fiscal and monetary policy, external demand (a channel 
for intra EU interdependencies) as well as exogenous shocks on the output gap (the 
gap between actual and potential GDP). The equation is written as an error-
correction model. It may also take into account possible long run effects of macro-
economic policies such as long term fiscal policy, debt-related threshold effects and 
hysteresis on potential output. The stabilization of the economy stems from adjust-
ments in the long run interest rates and competitiveness, which have effects on the 
output gap in the long-term part of the equation and in the short-term. The stabiliza-
tion may then hinge on private demand (through interest rates adjustment and mone-
tary policy) and on external demand (through the decrease in relative prices). The 
parameterization allows simulating standard hypothesis as well as alternatives, 
checking the dependence of results on different sets of hypotheses. Furthermore, the 
size of fiscal multipliers is allowed to move along the business cycle and the level of 
public debt. The ineffectiveness of monetary policy is made possible when the econ-
omy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB); iii) external demand is modelled using a bilat-
eral trade matrix representing interdependencies between countries. The trade matrix 
is also used as a basis for imbalances analysis; iv) we model prices by a generalized 
Phillips curve relating current and expected inflation to economic activity, imported 
inflation and other exogenous shocks. Expectations can be modelled as adaptive 
(backward-looking) or rational (forward-looking); v) a Taylor rule sums up monetary 
policy, except under the ZLB. Monetary policy becomes expansionary when the out-
put gap is negative considering that inflation is close to the target fixed at 2%; vi) 
according to the expectations theory, the long term interest rate for German public 
bonds is set equal to the expected sum of future short term interest rates (Robert J. 
Shiller 1979), with short term interest rates set by the central bank. The long term 
public rate for Germany is considered risk free, and long term public rates of other 
countries include a risk premium that is set exogenously. We also temporarily set 
exogenously the long rate for countries that entered the EFSF to account for a lower 
interest rate on debt refinancing. Finally, for each country the long term interest rate 
on private bonds is equal to the public one plus a risk premium that is set exoge-
nously. The long term real interest rate on private bonds is then equal to the private 
nominal long term rate minus long run expected inflation; vii) the public balance 
separates interest payments, cyclically-adjusted balance and cyclical components, in 
order to properly assess the fiscal stance, i.e. the part of fiscal policy which is under 
the direct control (discretion) of current governments. We then deduce public debt 
projections for euro area countries.  
In the model, GDP is written as a gap between the actual level of GDP and a 
baseline trajectory determined by a constant potential growth. However, we distin-
guish this baseline from the potential GDP, which can differ from the baseline due to 
possible hysteresis effects of recession or fiscal policy on potential GDP (Figure 1). 
As a result, we model three gaps for GDP: a) ݕ෤௖ is the gap between log of real GDP ܻ of country c, and its baseline trajectory തܻ which is exogenous; b) ݕ௖∗ is the gap be-
tween log of potential GDP ܻ∗ of country c and the baseline തܻ; c) yc is the output gap 
of country c, hence the difference between ݕ෤௖ and ݕ௖∗. 
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The growth rate of the baseline for real GDP is set exogenously. The growth 
rate of potential GDP is equal to the baseline unless there is a long run impact of fis-
cal policy, hysteresis or a debt-threshold effect. The growth rate of real GDP is given 
by that of potential GDP and the output gap. The structural primary surplus evolves 
according to the fiscal impulse (which are set exogenously, at levels given by Stabil-
ity programmes, except otherwise stated) and to changes in taxes due to variations in 
the gap between potential production and the baseline. A permanent downward shift 
in potential production relative to the baseline entails a permanent fall in taxes, hence 
a permanent fall in the structural primary surplus. The average interest rate on debt 
evolves according to the long term nominal interest rate on newly issued public 
bonds. The average maturity of public debt is assumed to be constant. The inverse of 
average maturity gives the share of debt refinanced every year. Public debt (in % of 
nominal GDP) evolves according to its usual law of motion.  
 
 
 
Source: Independent Annual Growth Survey (iAGS) model, Observatoire français des conjonctures economiques (OFCE). 
 
 
Figure 1 Example: GDP Path and Potential GDP Path with Hysteresis 
 
The impact of fiscal policy is modelled according to the state of the economy, 
as in Jonathan A. Parker (2012), and in accordance with empirical papers (e.g. Alan 
J. Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko 2010)5 that show that the fiscal multiplier 
differs along the position of the economy in the cycle. The fiscal multiplier is mod-
elled as in Figure 2: its value is maximal (minimal) in very bad (good) times. We 
define normal times as economic states in which output gap is greater than -1.5% and 
lesser than 1.5%. In that case, we fix the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier to 0.5 
for large countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), and to 0.3 for other countries, 
accounting for the fact that fiscal multipliers are generally smaller for small countries 
                                                        
5 See Anja Baum and Gerrit B. Koester (2011) and Jérôme Creel, Heyer, and Matthieu Plane (2011) for 
empirical estimates resp. for Germany and France. See Pascal Michaillat (2014) for a theoretical ap-
proach on non-linear fiscal multipliers and Philip Arestis (2011) who addresses the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy as a macroeconomic instrument of stabilisation policy. 
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(Ethan Ilzetsky, Enrique Mendoza, and Carlos A. Vegh 2011). When output gap is 
over 1.5%, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier linearly decreases to 0, until 
output gap reaches 6%. In bad times, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier in-
creases as output gap deteriorates. We set its maximum value to 2 when output gap 
reaches -6%. Drawing on exogenous fiscal impulses, we compute the effective fiscal 
impulse: it is the ex ante cumulative real effect of current and past fiscal impulses at 
time t. It must yet be noted that the ex ante multiplier does not take into account 
monetary policy effects and feedback effects of external trade on GDP following a 
fiscal impulse. We retain 7 lags to account for the possibility of long lasting effects 
of fiscal impulses (see an example in Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ߤ௠௔௫ = 2, ߤ଴ = 0.5, ߤ௠௜௡ = 0, ݕ௠௜௡ = −6%, ݕ௜௡௙ = −1.5%, ݕ௦௨௣ = 1.5%, and ݕ௠௔௫ = 6%.  
Values are taken as illustrative and may vary across countries. 
Source: OFCE. 
 
 
Figure 2  Example of the Value of the Multiplier According to the Output Gap 
 
 
 
 
Source: OFCE. 
 
 
Figure 3  Effective Fiscal Impulse in Normal Times with Following a Positive Fiscal Impulse  
 (1% of GDP) 
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A critical point of calibration relates to the speed of convergence of output to 
its long run equilibrium. We set the same calibrated values across countries; they 
ensure that the speed of convergence is comparable in normal times to that of stan-
dard DSGE models: the output gap is closed more or less 5 years after a shock. 
Debt-related threshold effects on aggregate demand and fiscal policy effects 
on potential GDP are set to 0 for standard simulations. We calibrate the hysteresis 
effect to 0.15 in order to obtain qualitatively similar impacts of transitory and perma-
nent fiscal impulses on potential growth, as in the macro model of the Commission, 
QUEST III (Marco Ratto, Roeger Werner, and Jan in’t Veld 2009). The calibration 
of the sensitivity of tax revenues and expenditures to the business cycle draws on 
Commission’s estimates. To compute the average interest rate on public debt, we 
compute an average maturity of public debts using national sources on public debt 
maturity structures in 2011. We choose standard values for the monetary Taylor rule. 
The short term interest rate is bound at 0.05% to account for the ZLB. The long run 
nominal interest rate is set at 4% (Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and George R. Moore 1995). 
Values for the New Keynesian Hybrid Phillips curve are set in accordance with the 
empirical literature (Jeremy Rudd and Karl Whelan 2006; Maritta Paloviita 2008).  
 
3. The Actual Consolidation Path  
 
We analyze the dynamics of public finances and output losses of the path of consoli-
dation decided by the end of 2012. Baseline results are reported in Table 1 (see Box 
1 for a description of the main underlying assumptions). We simulate the path of 
public debt levels (expressed in percentage points of GDP) until 2032, which is the 
horizon of the 1/20th debt rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in the Fiscal 
Compact. The simulated path of public debt levels depends on the fiscal impulses 
over the period 2013-2015 which have been forecasted in the euro area and reported 
in Stability programs released in spring 2012. By assumption, we assume zero fiscal 
impulses beyond 2016. 
 
Box 1 Main Hypotheses for the Baseline Simulations 
 
Simulations start in 2013. To do so, we need to set some starting point values in 2012 
for a set of variables. Output gaps for 2012 come from iAGS 2013 forecasts. Potential 
growth for the baseline potential GDP is based on Asa Johansson et al. (2012) projec-
tions (see Table 1). Concerning fiscal policy and budget variables, the main hypothes-
es are as follows: 
 
1) the public debt in 2012 comes from the European Commission’s autumn 2012 
forecast;  
2) we use the iAGS 2013 forecasts for fiscal balance in 2012;  
3) we use the European Commission’s autumn 2012 forecast of interest expenditures 
for 2012; combined with iAGS 2013 forecasts of output gaps in 2012, and model 
estimates of the cyclical part of the fiscal balance, it gives the structural primary 
balance for 2012;  
4) Fiscal impulses come from iAGS 2013 forecasts for 2013 (see Table 2). For 2014-
2015, we use fiscal impulses implied by the Stability and Growth Pact reported in 
the “Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability programme” 
for each country;  
 48 Christophe Blot, Marion Cochard, Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré, Danielle Schweisguth and Xavier Timbeau 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2014, 1, Special Issue, pp. 39-57 
5) sovereign spreads come from iAGS 2013 forecasts for 2013-2015 (see Table 3). 
We made the hypothesis that the ECB program of unlimited debt buy backs on the 
secondary market (Outright Monetary Transactions) is effective and achieves its 
goal to bring down interest rates for Italy and Spain. Regarding countries relying 
on the ESM for debt financing, we assume that Ireland will get direct access to fi-
nancial markets as of 2014, Portugal as of 2015 and Greece as of 2016. 
 
Table 1  Main Hypotheses for 2012 in % 
 
 
Public debt Fiscal balance
Structural 
primary balan-
ce 
Interest expendi-
tures Output gap 
Potential 
growth 
Source European Com-mission 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
European Com-
mission 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
Germany 81.7 -0.2 2.7 2.4 -1.0 1.3 
France 90.0 -4.4 1.2 2.6 -6.2 2.0 
Italy 126.5 -2.5 5.8 5.5 -5.5 1.3 
Spain 86.1 -7.4 -0.7 3.0 -8.5 2.0 
Netherlands 68.8 -4.4 -0.9 2.0 -2.8 2.0 
Belgium 99.9 -3.5 2.6 3.5 -4.8 2.0 
Portugal 119.1 -5.5 1.7 4.5 -6.1 1.5 
Ireland 117.6 -8.0 -1.0 4.0 -7.4 2.2 
Greece 176.7 -6.7 4.8 5.4 -14.1 1.9 
Finland 53.1 -0.9 1.3 1.1 -2.1 2.2 
Austria 74.6 -3.0 0.1 2.6 -1.1 1.6 
 
Source: European Commission, iAGS 2013 forecasts. 
 
 
 
Table 2 Fiscal Impulse in % of GDP 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
France -1.8 -0.6 -0.5 
Italy -2.1 0.0 0.0 
Spain -2.5 -1.2 -0.6 
Netherlands -1.2 -1.2 -0.5 
Belgium -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 
Portugal -2.9 -0.6 -0.2 
Ireland -1.8 -2.1 -1.8 
Greece -3.9 -2.7 -0.9 
Finland -1.3 0.0 0.0 
Austria -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 
 
Source: iAGS 2013 forecasts. 
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Table 3  Sovereign Spreads Relative to German Interest Rate on Public Debt in % 
 
 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Italy 1.3 0.8 0.0 
Spain 1.5 0.8 0.0 
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.5 0.1 0.0 
Portugal 1.4 1.2 1.0 
Ireland 1.4 1.5 0.0 
Greece 1.4 1.2 0.9 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Source: iAGS 2013 forecasts. 
 
Table 4 shows tough austerity measures: between 2013 and 2015, all member 
states (MS), except Germany and Finland, will achieve cyclically-adjusted primary 
improvements in their public deficit equal to, or above, 2% of GDP. Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece will make even stronger efforts. This sharp fiscal contraction will 
make it ever harder to achieve an output gap at, or above, zero: all MS will have to 
wait until 2019 (Austria, Finland), 2020 (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal) or 
2021 to close the output gap. Meanwhile, the aggregate euro area GDP will plummet 
to a maximum negative output gap of almost -5%. Hence, the cumulated fiscal im-
pulse, starting from negative output gaps under which fiscal multiplier effects are 
strong, will lead to gloomy prospects for the entire euro area. Only Germany and 
Austria will be exceptions.  
 
Table 4  Baseline Scenario 
 
 Public debt (% of GDP) 
Structural balance 
(% of GDP) 
Cumulated fiscal
impulse 
(% of GDP) 
Average annual 
growth 
Maximum 
negative 
output gap 
reached 
Sovereign rate 
spread to 
Germany 
 2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2015 2013-2017 2018-2032 2013-2032 2013-2015 
Germany 82 67 26 0.3 0.9 1.8 -0.3 1.4 1.3 -0.7 0.0 
France 90 91 52 -1.4 -0,2 0,2 -2.9 1,9 2.2 -6.8 0.0 
Italy 127 109 18 0.3 2.4 5.5 -2.1 1.6 1.4 -6.5 0.7 
Spain 86 101 83 -3.7 -2.1 -2.2 -4.3 1.7 2.3 -9.7 0.8 
Netherlands 69 68 48 -2.9 -0.8 -0.8 -2.9 2.0 2.1 -2.8 0.0 
Belgium 100 91 38 -0.9 0.6 1.8 -2.2 2.1 2.1 -4.3 0.2 
Portugal 119 133 79 -2.8 -0.8 0.7 -4.7 0.9 1.8 -10.1 1.2 
Ireland 118 140 105 -5.0 -2.4 -2.3 -5.7 1.0 2.6 -10.9 1.0 
Greece 177 199 93 -0.6 1.3 3.0 -7.5 0.2 2.5 -17.1 1.1 
Finland 53 45 8 0.2 0.1 1.9 -1.3 2.4 2.2 -1.9 0.0 
Austria 75 68 40 -2.5 -0.3 0.3 -1.9 1.7 1.6 -0.9 0.0 
Euro area 94 88 43 -1.0 0.3 1.2 -2.2 1.6 1.8 -4.8 0.3 
 
Source: Eurostat, iAGS model. 
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Real divergence across euro area member states under this scenario will thus 
widen: Greece will hit the floor with a massive output gap of -17%. Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal will face substantial losses with output gaps reaching abnormal levels 
around -10%, and France and Italy will be quite harshly hit, touching the ground at -
7% after austerity measures are implemented.  
The multi-speed euro area in terms of output losses will also be reflected in 
structural balances and public debt ratios. In 2017, despite substantial fiscal efforts, 
Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Ireland will not be able to bring their cyclically-
adjusted deficit under 0.5% of GDP. Spain, Portugal and Ireland will not be able to 
reach the public-debt-to-GDP threshold of 60% of GDP by 2032. The case of Greece 
is interesting: despite an extraordinary structural surplus of 3% of GDP and an out-
standing negative fiscal impulse of 7.5% of GDP between 2013 and 2015, it would 
not achieve the 60% threshold. The reason lies in deflation between 2014 and 2018 
which will increase the real interest rate. 
Another striking result is the degree of excessive austerity implemented by 
most countries reaching lower debt ratio at the 5-year horizon. Though European 
rules require only a maximum deficit of 0.5% of GDP (see Section 2), Germany, Ita-
ly, Belgium, Greece and Finland achieve structural surpluses. This situation indicates 
that there is leeway to perform less restrictive fiscal policies without breaching EU 
fiscal rules. 
Finally, the baseline scenario questions the issue of public debt sustainability 
in the euro area. Consistently with the new fiscal framework, it seems relevant to fix 
a 20-year horizon for assessing debt sustainability. Though this definition of fiscal 
sustainability has no theoretical nor empirical rational, it is the interpretation given 
by the treaties. Then it may be seen as an institutional definition of sustainability. 
Yet, the issue of public debt sustainability is theoretically and empirically unsettled, 
between promoters of investigating the statistical properties of public finances’ va-
riables on the one hand, and, on the other hand, promoters of a “return to economic 
thinking” (Henning Bohn 2007). Stated briefly, sustainability refers to the ability of 
the general government to pay back the domestic public debt. This ability depends on 
the available future scope for spending cuts and tax hikes, but also on future econom-
ic growth. It is then far more complex than the compliance to a certain threshold at a 
given horizon. The definition of the target for public debt at 60% may certainly be 
debated, but it is the rule set in the treaties and the aim here is to identify strategies 
that comply with existing fiscal rules. 
Therefore, in our simulations, the public debt “sustainability” is assessed re-
garding the ability of countries to meet the objective of bringing back the debt ratio 
to 60% of GDP by 2032. Though some countries in our baseline simulations do not 
reach this 60% threshold, it is noticeable that they achieve substantial reductions in 
public debt-to-GDP ratios. For instance, Greece would halve its ratio and Ireland’s 
debt would decrease by 35 percentage points of GDP between 2017 and 2032. This 
downward trend in public debt implies enhanced debt sustainability stricto sensu. 
However the social costs as well as the cost in terms of fiscal balance could make 
this adjustment unrealistic. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and Belgium, it would indeed 
require structural primary surpluses above 3% of GDP for many years, which have 
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rarely been achieved in history of fiscal consolidation. The International Monetary 
Fund (2012) has recently analysed strategies used by countries with public debt 
overhangs (that is with debt exceeding 100 % of GDP) to consolidate. The average 
primary balance, during the period of consolidation, is 2.4 % of GDP. This is only 
1.2 point above the average primary balance observed during periods of increases in 
public debt. 
However, simulations also show that the long-run debt-to-GDP ratio in some 
euro area MS is astonishingly low: 26% in Germany, 18% in Italy, even 8% in Fin-
land. It questions the relevance of fiscal austerity in these countries, because public 
bonds are highly demanded on financial markets, especially “risk-free” bonds like 
German Bunds. It is likely that the fiscal requirements of the baseline scenario go too 
far in terms of fiscal sustainability in most euro area countries. To sum up, the scena-
rio considers fiscal restrictions that go beyond the requirements of fiscal sustainabili-
ty, beyond the requirements of EU fiscal rules and beyond the social resilience of 
European citizens.  
The first variant that we introduce in the baseline scenario refers to “fiscal sus-
tainability” stemming from EU treaties and regulations. Sustainability refers here to 
the ability of EU MS to converge towards a debt target of 60% of GDP. Therefore, 
we compute simulations that aim at gauging if all countries can reach the public debt 
target in 2032. We calculate a sequence of fiscal impulses over 2015-2032 that 
achieve the target, assuming that fiscal impulses for the years 2013 to 2015 are left 
unchanged. For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses after 2012 at -0.5 or +0.5 depend-
ing on the gap vis-à-vis the target: the fiscal impulse is positive (resp. negative) if 
actual debt is below (resp. above) the target. The absolute value of cumulated fiscal 
impulses is larger than in the baseline scenario for countries which cannot achieve 
60% in this scenario, and lower otherwise. For Germany, Italy and Finland, it would 
notably imply a significant expansionary fiscal policy to stabilize the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at 60% in 2032. The aim here is to set a common target for public debt. The 
alternative scenarios may then be directly compared to this first variant as they will 
also aim at reaching the same target. By this way, the more active fiscal policies im-
plemented in those countries would also support growth in weaker countries. Such a 
strategy should certainly rest on enhanced cooperation between member states. There 
are of course no rational for these countries to target 60% as a national objective. 
But, it is the easiest way to fix a sort of norm for debt-to-GDP ratio. We may indeed 
consider that there is no rational for Germany to be satisfied by a debt ratio of 26% in 
2032, and a structural surplus of 1.8%. For sure, the German government would have 
leeway to expand fiscal policy. 
Table 5 sums up the simulation results of this variant. Results are threefold. 
First, two countries - Ireland and Greece - are still unable to achieve the debt-to-GDP 
target. It does not preclude fiscal sustainability per se, but it entails further social 
unsustainability of public finances: the fiscal stance over the period 2013-2032 pro-
duces a cumulative fiscal impulse which is highly negative and twice as high (in ab-
solute values) as in the baseline scenario. Such a fiscal stance is entirely unrealistic 
and inefficient: economic growth in the medium-run would be lowered substantially, 
and the maximum negative output gap would be even larger. This outcome ensues 
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from the high value of the fiscal multiplier when the output gap is strongly negative, 
from inertial processes in economic growth once hysteresis is introduced, and from 
the relatively insufficient decrease in real interest rates, since these two countries 
suffer from low or negative inflation rates until 2020.  
Second, Spain and Portugal achieve the debt target in 2032, but under substan-
tially more restrictive fiscal stances. Fiscal adjustment under such conditions seems 
unrealistic and unreasonable: between 2013 and 2017, both countries would expe-
rience slower economic growth than in the baseline, hence postponing until 2025 
(Portugal) and 2027 (Spain) the return to a zero output gap. 
Third, countries with public debt levels below the debt target in 2032 have fis-
cal leeway: indeed, the cumulated fiscal impulse improves by 2.7 percentage points 
in Germany, 1 in France, 4.2 in Italy, 5.7 in Finland and 1.4 in Austria in this scena-
rio compared to the baseline. Despite fiscal leeway and relatively high fiscal multip-
liers in the short run, the net gain in terms of economic growth is very small. The 
reason lies in trade interactions within the euro zone: larger margins for maneuver in 
some countries are compensated by larger real difficulties incurred by the implemen-
tation of a more restrictive fiscal stance in Southern countries and Ireland.  
 
Table 5 First Variant: Fiscal Sustainability 
 
 Public debt (% of GDP) 
Structural balance 
(% of GDP) 
Cumulated fiscal
impulse 
(% of GDP) 
Average annual growth Maximum negative output gap reached 
 2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032 2013-2017 2018-2032 2013-2032 
Germany 82 68 60 0.3 -0.1 -1.8 2.4 1.5 1.3 -0.7 
France 90 89 60 -1.4 -1.1 -0.8 -1.9 2.3 2.1 -6.8 
Italy 127 109 60 0.3 1.4 0.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 -6.5 
Spain 86 104 60 -3.7 -1.3 1.3 -8.2 1.3 2.2 -9.8 
Netherlands 69 68 60 -2.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.0 2.1 2.0 -2.8 
Belgium 100 91 60 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 2.3 2.1 -4.3 
Portugal 119 137 60 -2.8 -0.1 3.7 -8.2 0.4 1.8 -10.2 
Ireland 118 144 71 -5.0 -1.7 5.2 -13.7 0.5 2.5 -11.0 
Greece 177 206 84 -0.6 1.9 8.9 -15.5 -0.4 2.3 -17.3 
Finland 53 46 60 0.2 0.1 -4.3 3.4 2.5 2.2 -1.9 
Austria 75 69 60 -2.5 -1.2 -1.7 -0.5 1.8 1.6 -0.9 
Euro area 94 89 61 -1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 1.7 1.8 -4.9 
 
Source: Eurostat, iAGS model. 
 
4. Searching for an Alternative Strategy 
 
In this section, we address the issue of the opportunity to soften the consolidation 
path. The scope of alternative scenarios is inevitably infinite and any scenario reduc-
ing the strength of fiscal consolidation would improve growth, but it may also un-
dermine public debt sustainability6. The identification of an alternative strategy is 
then based on a trade-off between growth and debt. The aim of this section is to iden-
tify a strategy reducing the output losses of consolidation while keeping constant the 
objective for public debt. In theory, it boils down to an optimal control problem 
                                                        
6 The model does not integrate any mechanism through which debt would have a negative effect on 
activity per se. 
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which may be solved using the appropriate algorithm. However, there is no ex ante 
guarantee that the optimal solution may be one that can be implemented in practice. 
Conversely, we are seeking a solution compatible with the spirit of the various fiscal 
rules governing euro area MS. Though fiscal rules have been criticized (Catherine 
Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak 2013), we adopt here a pragmatic view where we seek 
alternative strategies compatible with existing rules. Even if treaties may or should 
be modified, the process may take time whereas there is an urgent need to consider 
alternative macroeconomic policies.  
Taking into account the objective of the TSCG, we maintain the objective for 
public debt at 60% of GDP in 2032. We also claim that the current rules leave lee-
way for an alternative strategy as a minimum annual improvement of the cyclically-
adjusted balance (net of one-off measures) of 0.5% of GDP is held to be consistent 
with the required correction of an excessive deficit.  
Starting from this, we consider the case where the consolidation is spread out 
from 2013 onwards. We implement a yearly consolidation of 0.5 point of GDP con-
sistent with the objective of 60% of debt in 2032 as identified in the previous sec-
tion7. The main difference with the scenario described in Table 5 is that we replace 
the scheduled consolidation path from 2013 until 2015 (see Table 2 in Box 1) by a 
consolidation, which does not exceed 0.5% of GDP from 2013 until 2032. For those 
countries (Greece and Ireland) where the 60% debt ratio was not reached in 2032, we 
implement the same spread consolidation strategy from 2013 to 2032. The aim here 
is simply to check whether a milder consolidation would reduce output losses while 
maintaining the objective of bringing the debt ratio back towards 60% in twenty 
years.  
The efficiency of such a strategy, in which austerity is softened but not de-
layed, should first be assessed regarding the average growth rate over the period. 
From this, it appears clearly that on the 2013-2017 period, the average growth for the 
euro area as a whole is 0.6 point higher (Table 6) than in a scenario where the consol-
idation is not spread over time. Under a softened consolidation stance, a larger share 
of the fiscal contraction would occur after the output gap has recovered. The negative 
impact on growth would be reduced. Consequently, the consolidation stance required 
to fulfill fiscal sustainability would be lowered because consolidation would be more 
efficient (in terms of debt reducing) when the output gap is closed.  
The most striking difference is identified for Greece where the average growth 
between 2013 and 2017 would be 3.6 points higher than if the current expected con-
solidation path were implemented. Besides, this strategy would enable Greece to re-
duce debt in 2032 more significantly even though the cumulated fiscal stance would 
be loosened, amounting to -3.3 points of GDP in the spread consolidation scenario 
against -15.5 points otherwise. It must however be noticed that from 2018 until 2032, 
growth would be slightly reduced in the softened scenario since it also involves a 
longer time span of consolidation. The situation of Greece is the most symptomatic 
of the actual ill-designed consolidation. The Greek public deficit results mainly from 
cyclical effects and interest payments. The structural deficit amounts to -0.6% of 
                                                        
7 In the extended version of the first iAGS report, we also study an alternative strategy consisting in de-
laying consolidation; see OFCE-ECLM-IMK (2013). 
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GDP for 2012 which is already near the so-called “golden rule” enacted in the fiscal 
compact. It seems urgent for Greece to reduce the consolidation pace. This is a con-
dition for growth to resume and for a reduction of the cyclical deficit. Such a strategy 
would also avoid a deflation episode in Greece. The real interest rate between 2013 
and 2017 would be indeed 2 points less than in the scenario where the fiscal stance is 
what is currently scheduled in the Stability programme. Finally, spreading the con-
solidation would lead to structural surplus of 0.8% for Greece in 2017 instead of 1.9 
% for the scenario where consolidation is not spread. By 2032, the structural balance 
would reach 3.5% of GDP, which is still quite high relative to historical standards but 
it is nevertheless significantly less than in the baseline scenario (8.9% of GDP). 
If we turn to the other countries, results are in the same vein even if the con-
trast is less striking. Thus, the average growth for the 2013-2017 period would be 
higher for all euro area countries except Austria, where there would be no change in 
growth. For the other countries, the benefit would range from 0.1 point in Germany 
to 2.2 points in Ireland. Portugal, Spain and Italy would be the countries benefiting 
the most from such a strategy. 
  
Table 6  Second Variant: Softening Consolidation 
 
 Public debt (% of GDP) 
Structural balance 
(% of GDP) 
Cumulated fiscal
impulse 
(% of GDP) 
Average annual growth Maximum negative output gap reached 
 2012 2017 2032 2012 2017 2032 2013-2032 2013-2017 2018-2032 2013-2032 
Germany 82 72 60 0.3 -1.1 -1.3 1.8 1.6 1.3 -0.5 
France 90 86 60 -1.4 -1.0 -0.9 -1.3 2.6 2.1 -4,7 
Italy 127 104 60 0.3 -0.6 0.9 2.4 2.6 1.2 -2.7 
Spain 86 96 60 -3.7 -2.6 0.8 -6.0 2.5 2.1 -6.3 
Netherlands 69 69 60 -2.9 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9 2.2 2.0 -2.3 
Belgium 100 89 60 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 0.4 2.7 2.0 -2.9 
Portugal 119 119 60 -2.8 -0.9 1.9 -3.9 1.9 1.6 -4.2 
Ireland 118 125 67 -5.0 -3.7 3.9 -9.5 2.7 2.3 -5.6 
Greece 177 150 60 -0.6 0.8 3.5 -3.3 3.2 2.0 -8.0 
Finland 53 54 60 0.2 -2.1 -3.0 2.0 2.7 2.1 -1.1 
Austria 75 71 60 -2.5 -1.5 -1.5 -0.7 1.8 1.6 -0.8 
Euro area 94 90 62 -1.0 -1.3 -0.4 -0.4 2.3 1.8 -3.1 
 
Source: Eurostat, iAGS model. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Drawing on a reduced-form model of most euro area member states, we show that 
the frontloaded strategy endorsed by governments, under the auspices of the Euro-
pean Commission, is fruitless in terms of economic growth and also in terms of fiscal 
sustainability. Beyond clarifying the failure of this strategy, we discuss an alternative 
scenario built upon simulations based on the same reduced-form model. We suggest 
that keeping the target of a debt ratio of 60 % by 2032 and softening consolidation 
would enhance growth. For most countries, long-term sustainability of public fin-
ances would be fulfilled while in the short run, economic growth would be higher. 
The reduced-form model, though it departs from optimal control modeling, in-
cludes major features of the so-called New Consensus (New Classical) school: (part-
ly) forward-looking expectations by consumers, firms and financial markets, a Taylor 
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rule to describe monetary policy setting, the introduction of risk premia on public or 
private bonds, reliance on the disputable concept of “output gap” and a zero-lower-
bound to describe non-linear monetary policy. Despite the closeness of our model 
with some used in large international institutions like the European Commission, we 
achieve new results as regards the appropriate pace of fiscal consolidation in the euro 
area. Two assumptions are important: fiscal multipliers vary along the business cycle 
and hysteresis effects maintain the drop of real GDP vis-à-vis its potential. Both as-
sumptions are clearly grounded in recent literature and empirical facts. The introduc-
tion of a softened pace of consolidation in the euro area, in due respect of the Euro-
pean treaties, would significantly alleviate the social consequences of the crisis as it 
would slowdown unemployment. To make this alternative strategy fully effective, a 
strong commitment by governments to reduce debt-to-GDP ratio in the future is of 
course required: debt reduction must be planned, but only after the output gap has 
substantially decreased, therefore limiting the costs of consolidation.  
Further research will be dedicated to extending the model to non-euro-area 
countries, to endogenizing risk premia and long-term growth, and to introducing cur-
rent account dynamics and potential negative effects of public debt in the vein of 
Alexandru Minea and Patick Villieu (2011). 
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